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Abstract Research suggests that language comprehenders
simulate visual features such as shape during language com-
prehension. In sentence-picture verification tasks, whenever
pictures match the shape or orientation implied by the previ-
ous sentence, responses are faster than when the pictures mis-
match implied visual aspects. However, mixed results have
been demonstrated when the sentence-picture paradigm was
applied to color (Connell, Cognition, 102(3), 476–485, 2007;
Zwaan & Pecher, PLOS ONE, 7(12), e51382, 2012). One of
the aims of the current investigation was to resolve this issue.
This was accomplished by conceptually replicating the origi-
nal study on color, using the same paradigm but a different
stimulus set. The second goal of this study was to assess how
much perceptual information is included in a mental simula-
tion. We examined this by reducing color saturation, a manip-
ulation that does not sacrifice object identifiability. If reduc-
tion of one aspect of color does not alter the match effect, it
would suggest that not all perceptual information is relevant
for a mental simulation. Our results did not support this: We
found a match advantage when objects were shown at normal
levels of saturation, but this match advantage disappeared
when saturation was reduced, yet still aided in object recog-
nition compared to when color was entirely removed. Taken
together, these results clearly show a strong match effect for
color, and the perceptual richness of mental simulations dur-
ing language comprehension.
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Mental simulation
Many empirical studies have supported theories of grounded
cognition, which suggest that we use the same sensorimotor
regions in the brain during activity as during cognitive pro-
cesses, through the use of mental simulations (Barsalou, 1999,
2008). It has been argued that activation of perceptual areas in
the brain during language comprehension are not merely epi-
phenomenal but that language can, in addition to communica-
tion, serve as a control mechanism to shape mental content
(Lupyan & Bergen, 2015). One such experiment examined
whether we create mental simulations of an object’s orienta-
tion when the orientation is implied in the sentence (Stanfield
& Zwaan, 2001; Zwaan & Pecher, 2012). The study showed
that when the implied orientation matches the orientation of
the object shown in an object-verification task, that reaction
times are shorter than when theymismatch, suggesting that we
create mental simulations during sentence comprehension.
This match advantage has also been found for visual aspects
such as shape (Zwaan, Stanfield, & Yaxley, 2002), visibility
(Yaxley & Zwaan, 2006), and motion (Zwaan, Madden,
Yaxley, & Aveyard, 2004); has been found for children
(Engelen, Bouwmeester, de Bruin, & Zwaan, 2011) as well
as for the elderly population (Dijkstra, Yaxley, Madden, &
Zwaan, 2004); that spoken words also rapidly activate visual
representations that affect our ability to recognize objects
(Ostarek & Huettig, 2017); and the shape of an object be-
comes activated during encoding, and not simply during re-
trieval (Zeng, Zheng, & Mo, 2016).
However, mixed results have been found when this
sentence-picture paradigm was applied to color. For instance,
Connell’s (2007) study illustrated an advantage in the mis-
match condition. Connell (2007) suggested that color may
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be represented differently than other visual features because it
is one of the few object properties that is unimodal, (i.e., it can
only be perceived with the visual modality) and has been
shown to be less vital to object identification than shape
(Tanaka, Weiskopf, & Williams, 2001) or orientation (Harris
& Dux, 2005). Thus, it should be easier for participants to
ignore mismatching color information and focus on a stable
object property such as shape than to ignore the matching
color as it aids in solving the task demands and requires pro-
cessing. Zwaan and Pecher (2012), however, conducted six
replication experiments to investigate this match advantage in
greater detail for object orientation, shape, and color, and
found a match advantage for all three object properties.
Moreover, the match advantage for color had a larger effect
size than those for shape and orientation. Another study also
appeared to support a match advantage for color, as reading
words in a color (e.g., white ink) matching the color implied
by a previous sentence (e.g., Joe was excited to see a bear at
the North Pole) facilitated reading times (Connell & Lynott,
2009).
These contradictory findings in studies examining color as
part of mental simulations prompt further questions into how
we process color during language comprehension and how
much sensory information we include in these simulations.
One possibility is that color is an unstable visual feature in
mental simulations, as the color of an object can change with-
out eliminating the ability to recognize the object, and there-
fore may play a less present role in mental simulations.
One of the goals of the current investigation was to address
the potential problem of color instability caused by the stim-
ulus set used in the original study (Connell, 2007) and in the
replications (Zwaan & Pecher, 2012). To address this issue,
we created a stimulus set that met more stringent criteria with
regard to the visual features than the earlier stimulus sets did.
For example, there were some items in the previous study in
which features other than color could vary (i.e., a steak that is
cooked has a different shape than a steak that is raw). This
problem does not occur for more carefully chosen, less vari-
able, items, such as a red or green tomato. Therefore, in the
current investigation, all potentially problematic items were
removed and replaced with stimuli that could undergo a color
change while their shape remained unaltered. Another differ-
ence in our stimulus set was that full-color photographs were
used rather than line drawings, to allow for a more realistic
representation of the described objects (Holmes & Wolff,
2011).
The second goal of the study was to examine how much
sensory information is captured in a mental simulation. Color
is a useful tool for exploring this, as it is the only visual feature
that can be decomposed into different dimensions, namely
hue, saturation, and brightness (Palmer, 1999). This decom-
position is solely a color aspect manipulation as the decompo-
sition process still allows for the object to be recognized (i.e.,
there is no change in shape, size, or orientation). For instance,
a tomato without hue will simply become a gray tomato,
maintaining its shape and preserving all other visual features.
At the same time, however, changes in color, saturation or
brightness affect the richness of the visual stimulus, as these
dimensions alter what is typical about the visual properties of
the stimulus. Thus, if these dimensions affect the richness of
the visual stimulus, is it necessary to represent them in a men-
tal simulation? When one processes a sentence implying a
certain color, is information regarding the saturation of the
color stored? For example, when reading about a ripe tomato,
would a simulation include a bright red, or would this not be
as vital to the simulation as other sensory information?
Our current study explored how much sensory information
is included in mental simulations by conducting four experi-
ments, using the same experimental paradigm as Connell
(2007) and Zwaan and Pecher (2012) where sentences are
used to imply a certain color, followed by an object-
verification task. For example, the sentence The driving in-
structor told Bob to stop at the traffic lights is used to imply a
red traffic light, rather than explicitly stating The driving in-
structor told Bob to stop at the red light. After reading a
sentence implying a certain color, participants see either a
matching (e.g., red light) or mismatching picture (e.g., green
light) and have to press a button on the keyboard verifying
whether the pictured object was mentioned in the previous
sentence, where the correct answer to experimental items al-
ways required a Byes^ response.
The first experiment was conducted as a conceptual repli-
cation of Connell’s (2007) and Zwaan and Pecher’s (2012)
experiments on color, to resolve which of the contradicting
findings has more empirical support. Given the previous liter-
ature, we predicted to find a significant match advantage.
Experiment 2a and 2b addressed the question of how much
perceptual information is included in a mental simulation.
This was accomplished by lowering the saturation of the pic-
tures used in Experiment 1 to the lowest level at which the hue
could still be recognized. It is possible that by reducing the
level of saturation in the picture there is less of an overlap with
what is currently being simulated, which could lead to there
being less facilitation of a response in the match condition
under low levels of saturation. A further possibility is that
rather than the match condition acting as a facilitatory mech-
anism, the match effect exists due to there being a vivid dif-
ference between what is simulated and what is pictured in the
mismatching condition. Reducing the level of saturation
would then reduce the disparity between the picture and the
simulation, leading to faster responses in the mismatch condi-
tion. In other words, there would be less interference.
Experiment 3 examined whether a match advantage still exists
when objects are shown completely in grayscale. This is of
interest for several reasons. First, if a match advantage does
appear under low levels of saturation, then it should disappear
Mem Cogn
when the pictures are shown in grayscale. Second, studies
have shown that color does aid in object recognition
(Bramão, Reis, Petersson, & Faísca, 2011). With this in mind,
we expect that participants’ response times (RTs) in
Experiments 1 and 2 will, overall, be faster than in
Experiment 3, where no color is present.
Experiment 1
Preregistration
The predictions, exclusion criteria, design, methods, analyses,
and materials of all the experiments reported in this article
were preregistered in advance of data collection and analysis
on an online research platform—Open Science Framework
(OSF; see Nosek & Bar-Anan, 2012; Nosek, Spies, &
Motyl, 2012, for a detailed discussion on replications and
preregistration). This ensured that confirmatory procedures
(hypotheses testing) were conducted according to a priori
criteria. In the current article, a clear distinction between con-
firmatory and explanatory analyses was made, as suggested
by De Groot (1956/2014). The post hoc analyses are included
in the Exploratory Analyses section.
Method
Participants Two hundred and five participants were recruit-
ed via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk1 (87 males, mean age
37.78 years, range: 20–87 years). The participants were paid
$1.50 for their participation.
Materials The experimental flow was programmed in
Qualtrics Survey Software. It allowed for an automatic collec-
tion of information such as Browser Type, Browser Version,
Operating System, Screen Resolution, Flash Version, Java
Support, and User Agent for each participant.
Pictures Thirty-two pictures were selected as experimental
items and 16 as filler items. The pictures were obtained from
the internet (Google image search engine). Picture size was
unified across the trials: none of the pictures exceeded 300 ×
300 pixels (approximately 7.9 × 7.9 cm onscreen). The objects
depicted in the images had one dominant color (e.g., green in
the green traffic light picture). The experimental items formed
16 pairs of objects, and pictures within a pair differed in color
(i.e., red traffic light vs. green traffic light). The pictures of the
objects within a pair were matched in terms of size and shape
to ensure that neither shape nor size could be a confounding
variable.
Sentences There were 48 sentences constructed in total: 32
experimental and 16 filler sentences. Similar to the pictures,
experimental sentences also formed pairs, with one sentence
implying one color of an experimental and the other implying
the color of the remaining item of the pair (see Fig. 1).
Participants viewed 16 experimental sentences and 16 filler
sentences. Eight comprehension questions were added to half
of the fillers to ensure that participants did not simply Bskim^
through a given sentence but read and understood it.
Additionally, six sentence-picture pairs were used as practice
trials.
Design and procedure Design and procedure were almost
identical to Connell (2007). There were four picture-
sentence combinations, so four lists were created so that each
group was presented with one of the possible combinations
(see Fig. 1). Each list contained the same proportion of
experimental and filler sentences, and the various colors
present in the pictures were spread evenly across
groups. Thus, the experiment was a 2 (sentence version:
Type 1, Type 2) × 2 (picture type: match, mismatch) ×
4 (lists) design, with sentence version and picture type
as within-subjects variables and lists as a between-
subjects variable.
Participants were instructed to read the sentence and press the
spacebar when they had understood it. They were informed
that each sentence would be followed by a picture, and their
task was to decide whether the depicted object was mentioned
in the preceding sentence. Participants were asked to respond
as quickly and accurately as possible by pressing the L key for
yes and the A key for a no answer. The responses were col-
lected and saved automatically by the Qualtrics Survey
Software. The instructions presented to the participants
warned them that occasionally they would receive a question
to test their comprehension of the previous sentence, to which
they would either agree (by pressing the L key) or disagree (by
pressing the A key). The trial sequence was as follows: a left
aligned vertically centered fixation cross appeared on the
screen for 1,000ms followed by the sentence. After a spacebar
press, a fixation cross was presented in the middle of the
screen for 500 ms followed by a picture. When a yes/no de-
cision was made, a blank screen appeared for 500 ms, after
which another trial began (see Fig. 2).
All experimental items required a yes response, and all
filler items required a no response. As participants received
six practice trials, it was clear for participants when a yes and
no response was required.
1 Amazon’s Mechanical Turk is an Internet marketplace that enables
businesses/researchers to recruit participants for surveys/social science
experiments.
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Results and discussion
The data from 42 participants were discarded from further
analysis: five participants were not native English speakers,
six participants reversed the response keys (which was indi-
cated by accuracy scores at or below 21%), and 31 had accu-
racy scores lower than 80%. The drop-out rates were not
equally spread across the four lists. To make the cells equal
and enable parametric tests to be run, the required number of
participants who were at the bottom of each list was removed
(total of 25). After the exclusion process, each list included 34
participants (136 participants in total). For the analysis, we
collapsed participants across lists as list was not a factor in
our preregistered plan of analysis. Finally, one item was
removed from the analysis as the average item accuracy was
below 80%. This would indicate that participants did not be-
lieve the pictured object belonged to the preceding sentence.
Earlier research using the picture verification paradigm has
used the median instead of mean reaction times (e.g., Stanfield
& Zwaan, 2001; Zwaan & Pecher, 2012; Zwaan et al., 2002).
An advantage of using medians compared to means is that
their use does not necessitate further decisions regarding out-
lier removal (e.g., whether to use cutoffs based on standard
deviations, absolute RTs, or a combination thereof).
A paired-samples t test was conducted to investigate
whether there was a match advantage for accuracy and RTs.
For the RT analysis, only RTs of correct responses were in-
cluded in the analysis. The participants showed significantly
Fig. 2 Example of an experimental trial sequence. (Color figure online)
Sentence Color (Exp.1) Saturation (Exp.2) Grayscale (Exp.3)
The driving instructor 
told Bob to stop/go at 
the traffic lights.
Fig. 1 Example of stimuli material used in each experiment. Amatching picture illustrates that color was implied by the sentence (i.e., red when asked to
stop at a traffic light), and a mismatching color illustrates that this color was not implied by the sentence. (Color figure on line)
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higher accuracy rates in the match condition (M = .96, SD =
.06) than in the mismatch condition (M = .90, SD = .11), t(135)
= 5.36, p < .001, d = 0.46, BF10 = 33380.05. The match
advantage was also found in the RTs: the match condition
was 104 ms faster than the mismatch condition (M = 1,230
ms, SD = 568 ms and M = 1,334 ms, SD = 676 ms, respec-
tively). This difference was significant, t(135) = 3.00, p =
.003, d = 0.26, BF10 = 6.88. Participants’ accuracy when
responding to the comprehension questions was high (M =
0.79, SD = 0.20).
These findings support the results of Zwaan and Pecher
(2012), rather than those of Connell (2007), and suggest that
color, like shape and orientation, is an object property that is
simulated during language comprehension.
Experiment 2a
The results of Experiment 1 served to illustrate that sentences
implying color are represented in mental simulations but
makes no conclusions as to how rich these simulations are.
If color is not present in mental simulations, then reducing
color saturation should not affect the match advantage. If we
do simulate color, however, and do so vividly, then showing a
mismatching pictures in full color should lead to a larger dis-
parity between the two conditions than when saturation of the
color is reduced. Experiment 2 examined this problem by
reducing color saturation to the lowest level at which the hue
can still be distinguished to test whether a match effect would
still appear, and whether it would be smaller than in
Experiment 1.
Norming study
A norming study was conducted in order to determine the
lowest saturation level possible at which a certain hue could
still be recognized using the same pictures as in Experiment 1.
Twenty-four subjects were shown six different saturation
levels per picture and were asked to choose the picture that
had the lowest level of saturation while they could still per-
ceive the associated hue. Picture saturation was adjusted using
Microsoft Office Picture Manager’s Color Enhancement Tool
(where −100 is a black and white/grayscale picture and 100 is
a very intense, color-rich picture). The pictures that were se-
lected by the majority of the participants as having the least
amount of color while still being able to recognize the hue
were used in the experiment.
Method
Participants Two hundred and eight participants (99 males,
mean age 37.93 years, range: 22–71 years) took part in this
Mechanical Turk experiment. The participants were paid
$1.50 for their participation.
Materials The stimuli used in the current experiment were
adapted from Experiment 1, and the levels of saturation cho-
sen for the stimuli were determined by the norming study
described above (see Fig. 1). The sentences remained
unchanged.
Design and procedure The design and procedure of
Experiment 2 were identical to that of Experiment 1.
Results and discussion
Sixty-eight participants were excluded from the analysis (five
were not native English speakers; four appeared to have re-
versed the keys; 14 had accuracy below 80%; and 45 partic-
ipants were excluded from the bottom of the lists to achieve
equal numbers of subjects per list), leading to a total of 140
participants being included in the analysis.
A paired-samples t test was conducted to investigate
whether there was a match advantage for accuracy and RTs.
The results indicated no difference in accuracy rates between
the match (M = .96, SD = .07) and mismatch condition (M =
.95, SD = .08), t(139) = 0.98, p = .331, d = 0.08, BF10 = 0.15.
There was also no difference in the RTs between the match (M
= 1,156 ms, SD = 558 ms) and the mismatch conditions (M =
1,165 ms, SD = 639 ms), t(139) = 0.25, p = .801, d = 0.02,
BF10 = 0.10. Comprehension accuracy was high (M = 0.81,
SD = 0.19).
Experiment 2b
There was some concern that Experiment 2 could not be ac-
curately tested using Mechanical Turk as there would be no
way to control for the brightness of participants’ computer
monitors. To cope with this limitation, we replicated
Experiment 2 in the lab at Erasmus University Rotterdam,
using International Psychology students who participated for
course credit.
Method
ParticipantsAs the current experiment was run in the lab, we
were constrained in the number of participants we could re-
cruit (to a greater extent than on Mechanical Turk), and there-
fore we aimed to include 80 participants in the analysis.
Ninety participants (23 male, mean age 20.02 years, range:
17–29 years) were recruited from the first year International
Bachelor of Psychology students at the Erasmus University
Rotterdam, where their English proficiency had to be suffi-
cient, as determined by having a TOEFL grade above 80.
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Participants were tested in the lab, which is equipped with 22-
in. TFTscreens with a resolution of 1920 × 1200 and a ratio of
16:10.
Materials The same materials as in Experiment 2a were used.
Design and procedure The design and procedure were iden-
tical to Experiments 1 and 2a, except that participants were
tested in the lab.
Results and discussion
Ten participants were excluded from further analysis: three
appeared to have reversed the keys and seven performed be-
low the 80% accuracy cutoff. Like the other experiments, use
of these exclusion criteria were preregistered on the OSF be-
fore data collection began. Eighty participants were included
in the analysis. Furthermore, one item was removed from the
analysis as an item analysis revealed an accuracy below our
80% cutoff. Fifteen experimental item pairs remained in the
analysis.
A paired-samples t test was conducted to investigate
whether there was a match advantage for accuracy and RTs
using a stimulus set low in contrast, with saturation levels
reduced to a point at which the hue was still recognizable.
The results indicated no significant difference in accuracy
scores between the match (M = .96, SD = .07) and mismatch
conditions (M = .95, SD = .08), t(79) = 0.62, p = .534, d =
0.07. Participants produced faster responses in the match than
in the mismatch condition (M = 846 ms, SD = 355 ms andM =
926 ms, SD = 548 ms, respectively), but this did not reach
statistical significance, t(79) = −1.78, p = .080, d = 0.20, BF10
= 0.55. Comprehension accuracy was high (M = 0.82, SD =
0.14).
The results from Experiment 2b also support the results
from Experiment 2a, as neither experiment found conclusive
evidence for a match effect.
Experiment 3
To further determine the effects of reduced saturation on the
match advantage, Experiment 3 was run using the same pic-
tures as Experiment 1 and 2, except they were shown in gray-
scale. As no hue is present in grayscale photos, no significant
difference between the match and mismatch condition is
expected.
Method
Participants Two hundred and twenty-two participants (98
males, mean age 38.64 years, range: 19–71 years) took part
in the current study, and were recruited fromMechanical Turk
and paid $1.50 for their participation.
Materials The pictures used in this experiment were adapted
from those used in Experiment 1 such that they were depicted
in gray shades (see Fig. 1). The gray shades were achieved by
changing the pictures to black and white by using Paint.NET
software. The sentences remained unchanged.
Design and procedure The design and procedure were iden-
tical to that of Experiments 1 and 2.
Results and discussion
Forty-two participants were excluded from further analysis:
Two reported that English was not their first language, seven
appeared to have reversed the keys, 12 performed below the
80% accuracy cutoff, and 21 last-run participants were re-
moved to equate the number of subjects per list. One hundred
and eighty participants were included in the analysis.
A paired samples t test was conducted to investigate wheth-
er there was a match advantage for accuracy and RTs using
pictures portrayed in grayscale. The results indicated that ac-
curacy rates in the match condition (M = .97, SD = .06) and in
the mismatch condition (M = .96, SD = .08) did not signifi-
cantly differ, t(179) = 1.89, p = .06, d = 0.14. In the RTs there
was also no significant difference between the match (M =
1,239 ms, SD = 641 ms) and mismatch conditions (M =
1,243 ms, SD = 558 ms), t(179) = 0.21, p = .834, d = 0.02,
BF10 = 0.09. Comprehension accuracy was high (M = 0.81,
SD = 0.19).
The results of Experiment 3 suggest that, when pictures are
shown completely in grayscale, there is no significant match
advantage present.
Exploratory analyses
We were interested in examining exactly how the match and
mismatch conditions differed from each other across experi-
ments. As such, we conducted several exploratory analyses to
gain a better appreciation of the processes that are occurring.
We conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA over the reac-
tion time data to examine the differences between
Experiments 1, 2a, and 3, where Bexperiment^ was the
between-subjects factor, and we found that there was a signif-
icant main effect of condition, F(1, 453) = 5.01, p = .026, and
a significant interaction between condition and experiment,
F(2, 453) = 3.30, p = .038. No main effect of experiment
was found, F(2, 453) = 1.58, p = .207. On the basis of these
results we decided to run additional analyses to see whether
the RTs from Experiment 2a significantly differed from
Experiments 1 and 3 per condition. A simple contrast revealed
that the RTs in the mismatch condition were significantly
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faster in Experiment 2a, t(274) = −2.26, p = .024, than in
Experiment 1. No further significant interactions were found
(see Fig. 3).
General discussion
Previous research on the presence of color in mental simula-
tions has come up with some contradictory findings (e.g.,
Connell, 2007; Zwaan & Pecher, 2012). One of the aims of
the current study was to conclusively establish whether color
is simulated or not. A second aim was to discover how much
perceptual information is present in a mental simulation.
Many object features have been studied in the past, but color
is the only feature that can be decomposed while the object’s
identifiability remains unchanged. It may be argued that the
match advantage exists because if a picture matches the per-
ceptual image in the mental simulation, then response time is
facilitated. When there is a mismatch, this facilitation cannot
occur and may instead result in interference, leading to longer
response times.
In order to successfully complete our first aim, the experi-
ments used more stringent criteria for the stimuli compared to
what was used by Connell (2007) and Zwaan and Pecher
(2012), as they included some items that could change shape
as well as color. Furthermore, the median reaction time rather
than the mean was used, such as in the replication by Zwaan
and Pecher (2012) and other studies using a similar paradigm,
as it allowed for less data to be discarded and was in line with
the methods of previous research.
Experiment 1 found a significant match advantage of 104
ms, which supports the hypothesis that color is indeed present
in mental simulations and supports the results by Zwaan and
Pecher (2012) and Connell and Lynott (2009). In order to
examine the richness of mental simulations and thus address
our second goal, Experiment 2 used items where the saturation
of the color was reduced to the lowest point at which the hue
was still recognizable. The results of this experiment found no
significant difference between the match and the mismatch
condition. Interestingly, however, exploratory analyses re-
vealed that the RTs in the mismatch condition were signifi-
cantly faster in Experiment 2a than in Experiment 1, while no
difference was found for the match condition. The results from
Experiment 2a therefore serve to illustrate two points: First,
the match advantage disappears when saturation in pictures is
lowered, and second, the reason it disappears is due to a speed-
ing up of response time in the mismatch condition. These
results are intriguing as they suggest that, rather than a picture
being more of a match leading to faster response times (i.e.,
facilitation), it would suggest that the match effect appears due
to there being a vivid difference between the pictured object
and the simulation in the mismatch condition, leading to in-
terference effects. Experiment 3 provides tentative evidence in
support of this hypothesis as well, as the average response
times of this experiment appear to fall in between those of
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2a, although this difference
does not reach significance. As the average difference in re-
action time between Experiment 2a and 3 is only 8 ms, it is
unrealistic to expect a significant difference using a between-
subjects analysis. It would be interesting for future studies to
examine, using a within-subjects paradigm, at which level of
700
800
900
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
Experiment 1 Experiment 2A Experiment 2B Experiment 3
R
es
p
o
n
se
 T
im
es
 (
m
s)
Match Mismatch
Fig. 3 Size of match advantage in Experiment 1, when pictures were shown at normal levels of saturation; Experiments 2A and 2B, when saturationwas
reduced; and Experiment 3, when all pictures were shown in grayscale. **p < .01. *p < .05. (Color figure online)
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saturation color can aid object recognition. Although the
between-subjects comparison in our exploratory analyses
were not significant, such future studies could illustrate that
the mere presence of color—even at the lowest level of satu-
ration during which the hue is still recognizable—serves to
enhance performance in the object-verification task. Indeed,
this is supported by the general literature stating that
color aids in object recognition (Bramão et al., 2011).
In addition to finding a match advantage in the RTs of
participants in Experiment 1, we also found a significant re-
duction in accuracy in the mismatch condition. As we re-
moved items that had an average accuracy below 80%, this
reduction cannot be explained by the pictures in that condition
not matching the sentence. The match advantage in the RTs
bear no relation to the accuracy scores, as only the RTs of
accurate responses were used. This reduction in accuracy
scores, however, could serve to explain why a match effect
exists at all. We previously argued that the match effect exists
due to a vivid difference occurring in the mismatch condition
between the pictured object and the simulation. The task par-
ticipants had to complete required them to only examine
whether the actually pictured object (with no instructions
mentioning color) was mentioned in the previous sentence.
A strategy that could aid in the completion of such an
object-verification task—in which speed is important—could
be that participants simply judge whether the picture they see
overlaps with what is present in the mental simulation. When
there is a vivid difference, or no overlap, between the picture
and the simulation, they are more likely to answer with an
incorrect no response. It would be interesting to examine
whether the removal of the instructions requiring speed would
eliminate the difference in accuracy between the two
conditions.
As for the Brichness^ of our mental simulations, we can
conclude that they are rich indeed, in the sense that they in-
clude multiple object properties. We already know that color
can be decomposed into different dimensions, namely hue,
saturation, and brightness. If the reduction in the level of one
of these dimensions (in our study: saturation) had not reduced
the match advantage, we would have had to argue that color
would not be present or relevant in a mental simulation. Our
study, however, found that by reducing saturation, the match
advantage disappears. Furthermore, we found tentative evi-
dence that the mere presence of color—even with low levels
of saturation—can aid in object recognition, compared to
when color is removed entirely.
In sum, the current study found further support that color is
another object property that is represented in mental simula-
tions, in addition to shape and orientation. Furthermore, we
have shown that by reducing saturation of the picture shown
we can remove the match advantage as well, while still being
involved in object recognition. This leads to the conclusion
that, when comprehending language, we build mental simula-
tions rich in perceptual detail.
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